Introduction
Utilitarianism, especially in the classical form advocated by Jeremy Bentham, is frequently and fiercely attacked for its inability to acknowledge and guarantee rights. Yet, despite their failure to acknowledge or refute Bentham's arguments, his contemporary critics nevertheless proudly produce as their concluding and conclusive argument a restatement of their premise. Bentham, they repeat, does not appreciate rights, he does not understand that human beings have certain a priori, imprescriptible rights as a consequence of their humanity. As a result, the debate about Bentham, utilitarianism and rights is reduced to a simple dichotomy, which sets a Kantian vision of humans as ends in themselves against a utilitarian conception that exploits humans as a means to an end. Those who wish to rescue Bentham from such criticism usually attempt to portray him as more amenable to Kantian ideas of humanity and the principles of rights than his critics suggests. Yet, by defending Bentham in this manner, they adopt the same dichotomy and collude in the repositioning of the debate around issues and within parameters that are quite foreign to Bentham's argument and which ensure its defeat.
Nevertheless, although the advocates of rights emerge victorious from this encounter, their triumph is somewhat ambivalent. It has not so much been won through the defeat of Bentham's ideas, as it has been built upon them. Bentham, in his long battle against Nature, had freed humanity from the authority and dictates of have been endowed by God with a form of natural equality, the desire to preserve themselves and the duty not to harm others. 4 Closer to home, the Declaration reveals the influence of the French enlightenment philosophes. Rousseau's discursion on an ideal social contract informed the idea of popular sovereignty, 5 while Montesquieu's support for the separation of powers also left its mark on the Declaration. 6 As an articulation of these various influences the Declaration was an important philosophical statement -but it was also much more. The clauses which echoed and corrected the established complaints about the abuses of the French monarchy provided a retrospective justification of the revolution and a source of legitimacy for the new government. 7 The Declaration also declared the aims and ideals of a state founded on the general will, without privilege or despotism. 8 Finally it was an effective plan for positive political and social change. 9 Thus, while the Declaration was revolutionary in a political, ideological and moral sense, it was the product of many varied and competing influences, which represented the ideals and exigencies of its time.
Nonsense Upon Stilts
Such a radical document was bound to incite criticism. One of the earliest, harshest and most effective critics was Jeremy Bentham. Although Bentham was originally a supporter of the French Revolution, he had soon become horrified at its excesses.
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His particular distaste for natural rights, however, had a much longer history. 54 This idea is blamed for leading the revolutionary government to believe that all dissenters were tyrants and all setbacks were caused by conspiracy. 55 Even if this relationship is treated with caution, it is undeniable that rights were an inspiration for later bourgeois revolutions and other rebellious movements such as decolonisation. 56 To deny rights their revolutionary potential is surely to deny them power or purpose. The very willingness to do so reveals a very different conception of rights to that which was prevalent in Bentham's world.
It should also be pointed out that Bentham's argument that rights are anarchical is not merely based on the right of resistance to oppression. Although he does argue that the phrase is dangerous because people will consider all unwelcome laws or acts of power as oppressive and liable to resistance, 57 he spends less polemic on this phrase than on many of the other articles. He appears equally, if not more disturbed by
Article 5, which states that the government can only prohibit acts which are harmful to society, and Article 16, which declares that governments that do not guarantee rights have no constitution. These clauses provoke harsh replies from Bentham. He declares that the first will promote insurrection against any government that fails to fulfil these expectations, 58 while the second proclaims that there is no government at all.
These are the characteristics of rights that, for Bentham, give rise to their anarchical potential. The belief in natural rights as the source and ideal of government and as the inalienable property of individuals gives rise to expectations that no government could fulfil. Every government will fall short and, when it does so, its subjects, thinking in terms of their individual due rather than the good of society, befuddled by the deceptive language of rights and motivated by their absolute, romantic promise, will be inspired to revolt rather than to engage in careful debate and reform. Moreover, they will have no qualms in doing so, since the Declaration has created an authority higher than law or government to which the people can have recourse. For Bentham, it is this foundation of political legitimacy on a utopian, unachievable fiction that makes rights so dangerous.
Thus, Bentham's critics have failed to address his actual arguments. They have not answered his challenge to the existence of natural rights, they have tried but failed to undermine his logic and they have disregarded his political fears on the grounds of a distorted view of rights. As a result, Bentham emerges as the winner of round one.
Round Two: Human Rights vs. Utilitarianism
Bentham may have won round one but round two is a very different fight. The adversaries have shifted position and changed their character; now utilitarianism has been put on the defence against the onslaught of human rights, the successor to natural rights. Moreover, the strategy has changed. Those critics who failed or omitted to defeat Bentham on his own turf now attempt to deliver a new, knockout blow. They declare that Bentham and his utilitarian philosophy are defective because they fail to 57 (CW), p. 342. 58 Ibid., p.336.
appreciate humans as Kantian individuals or to understand the value and purpose of extra-legal rights.
Human rights, in their contemporary form, are usually understood and justified in terms of some kind of a version of the Kantian individual. 59 Although this individual is seen and used in different ways, it is generally agreed that it is a rational, autonomous, moral agent, endowed with dignity and personal worth. Rights spring from, recognise and/or strengthen these features. Utilitarians, however, can neither properly appreciate nor safeguard such an individual. Indeed, as Bedau suggests, utilitarianism incorrectly privileges happiness rather than dignity or autonomy. 60 As a result, utilitarianism is accused of simply seeing people as replaceable possessors of sensory experiences, rather than valuable in themselves and beyond their capacity for happiness or suffering. 61 It is also argued that utilitarianism is unable to recognise individuals as separate beings. 62 Instead, it treats them as though they were all one person and considers their wellbeing only to the extent that it increases or diminishes the happiness of society. Consequently, there is no reason why the rights of some people should not be violated if it increases the welfare of the rest. 63 Thus, it concluded that utilitarianism treats people as means to a social end, rather than as a Kantian end in themselves.
As a result of utilitarianism's defective conception of the individual, it follows that it cannot understand or appreciate the importance of rights that are founded on such an individual. Utilitarians cannot understand that doing certain things to peoplekilling them, torturing them, imprisoning them on false pretexts -is just wrong, irrespective of the suffering it may cause. 64 Moreover, it is argued, because people are only seen as means to social ends, even if there are rights in place there would always be a danger that a utilitarian would be willing to dispense with them if a calculation proved that it was in the best interests of the community as a whole. Indeed, Lyons claims that even the legal rights that Bentham recognised would not be sacrosanct. 65 By arguing that utilitarianism must necessarily take the form of act-utilitarianism, 66 he concludes that any application of a legal right could be subject to a calculation of the general welfare that would, in certain circumstances, result in the right being abrogated. Therefore, utilitarianism is dismissed as an inadequate moral theory.
There have been various attempts to salvage utilitarianism from this condemnation. In these attempts, however, the defenders of utilitarianism have accepted many of the assumptions of rights advocates. This is shown particularly in their acknowledgment of the Kantian individual. Kantian philosophy had no influence on the Dec.laration or on Bentham's critique. 67 Indeed Bentham was only marginally concerned with the nature of humanity in Nonsense Upon Stilts. Nevertheless, only the staunchest utilitarians question the provenance or accuracy of the Kantian individual and when they do so it is usually for a purpose other than a contribution to this debate. 68 Those who wish to defend utilitarianism against the criticisms of rights advocates generally take for granted that the human subject of rights is, or should be, endowed with the intrinsic worth of the Kantian individual and then argue about the way that utilitarianism deals with this subject.
Thus, the defenders of utilitarianism refute the claim that it neglects individuals for the happiness of the community, calculated as an aggregate or average. Rather, Rosen argues, it is meant to be distributive; the happiness of each person is to be maximised. 69 Indeed, he argues that Bentham was aware of the potential dangers of a majority oppressing a minority and sought ways to avoid it, by substituting the 'greatest happiness principle' for the 'greatest happiness of the greatest number'.
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This acquiescence to the assumption of a Kantian individual leads inexorably to the acceptance of the contingent claims: that rights are necessary and good, that utilitarianism is potentially antagonistic to rights, and that it must be shown to be compatible with rights in some way if it is to be an acceptable theory. Thus, the defenders of utilitarianism make great efforts to show that utilitarianism does not entail the loss of principles or the circumvention of rights, legal or moral. One such defence claims that the importance of security and expectations in Bentham's thought means that even an act-utilitarian would adopt near stringent rights to protect the general welfare. 71 Alternatively, utilitarians defend their theory by insisting that it takes the form of rule utilitarianism, as opposed to Lyon's act utilitarianism. Rosen argues in this way that Bentham's theory was a 'bottom-up' approach to utilitarianism, in which secondary principles would be chosen for their ability to contribute to the general happiness and adhered to. Since a society will be better if there are principles that prevent the punishment of the innocent and that maintain respect for the life and dignity of humans, such principles would exist in a utilitarian community. 72 Indeed, some even go so far as to suggest that utilitarianism may be better than a belief in natural rights for protecting people, since it avoids the subjectivism of most moral theories and provides grounds for weighting various rights when they conflict.
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By answering the challenges of rights advocates in this way, the defenders of utilitarianism have colluded in the construction of a new debate which makes their defeat inevitable. Utilitarians simply cannot provide the absolute protection for rights that rights advocates demand and, if they were following Bentham, they should know that it can't be done. Yet the fact that they attempt to do so means that even their small successes become huge defeats. The more that they try to show how closely utilitarianism approximates human rights principles, the more it becomes obvious that it falls short and, more importantly, that it falls short of an accepted standard. 'poets, rhetoricians, and dealers in moral and intellectual poisons', which release 'a bastard brood of monsters, "gorgons and chimeras dire"'. 78 Moreover, he is enraged that Nature, rather than the sensible arguments of utility, is used as the source and measure of law. All 'the advantage in the world' are lost when set against 'the sacred and inviolable rights of man derived from the unenacted and unrepealable laws of Nature'.
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Bentham aimed to seize this power from Nature, to annihilate Nature as the source, legislator or measure of law. In her place, he wanted to set humanity. The utilitarian person, rational, feeling, autonomous, capable of self-government and selfdirection, was to be the measure and source of all things. It was through humans and their experience of pain and pleasure that the virtue or evil of law would be calculated.
A human legislator was to assess, create and promulgate law.
This endeavour to replace Nature with humanity is one of the most distinctive and significant features of Bentham's thought. It was not simply an inevitable result of his utilitarianism. Utilitarianism, at the time, could happily exist alongside a belief in Nature or God. 80 In fact, among Bentham's utilitarian predecessors in England were the religious leaders, Priestley and Paley, who associated utilitarianism with
God's will. 81 Nor was utilitarianism necessarily hostile to natural rights. On the contrary the two were frequently linked. Priestley, whose pamphlet converted
Bentham to utilitarianism, 82 referred to natural rights and unalienable rights as rights 'founded on a regard to the general good'. 83 Meanwhile, utilitarianism was equally influential on those who supported natural rights, as was shown by the idea of a right to 'the pursuit of happiness'. 84 Even the Declaration mentions 'utility' and the 'common good'. 85 Taking into account this intellectual climate, Bentham's severance of utilitarianism and rights, law and nature, can be seen as a major milestone and an important legacy.
Indeed, the precise terms of this legacy stand out even amidst the general burgeoning of individualism and emphasis on humanity in the Enlightenment.
Bentham was not alone in his concerns. Halévy points out that the common feature in
Bentham, Kant and Rousseau is individualism. 86 Arendt elaborates on this statement, locating Bentham and Kant at the same juncture in intellectual history and attributing to them a similar role. 87 She suggests that they were both responding to utilitarianism, and its incessant creation of means that turned the world into a collection of ephemeral objects, by finding an end in humanity and separating it from the world and nature. 88 This implies that Bentham was involved in a much wider and more complex project than the contemporary dichotomy posed by rights advocates would suggest.
Amidst this general focus on humanity, Bentham's specific contribution was to apply these concerns in his own pedantic and obsessive way to law and legislation. It was in this area that he was particularly successful. The events and ideas of history attest to his triumph. 89 While his utilitarian philosophy may have lost some support, it remained popular for long enough to inspire legal reform, 90 while his positivism has continued to be dominant. 91 This development may have been immanent in the revolutionary declarations of rights, with their emphasis on humanity, 95 but its complete realisation nevertheless represents a significant shift. It is especially noteworthy since, while this is a shift that should increase rather than solve the ontological problems attending rights, the claim that rights are based in humanity is generally unapologetic, unashamed and unquestioned. This possibility of such an implicit consensus is due, at least in part, to
Bentham. Having liberated humanity from Nature, having depicted an individual, autonomous person as the source and measure of law, this vision of humanity became available for appropriation by human rights advocates. This debt to Bentham's work is not diminished just because the human source of rights is seen in Kantian rather than Benthamite terms. Before a Kantian philosophy could be used to provide a source for rights in humanity, it had to be possible to want to find such a source, to They do not wish to defend Nature against Bentham; they are the beneficiaries of his attack. To this extent, Bentham has won a paradoxical, maybe pyrrhic, victory. Copyright © 2003, Amanda Alexander. This file may be copied on the condition that the entire contents, including the header and this copyright notice, remain intact.
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